This article investigates how indigenous movements in Latin America promote the political inclusion of historically marginalized indigenous groups. I argue that the social pressure produced by a strong movement promotes the inclusion of indigenous representatives in formal leadership positions. However, this effect depends both on movements' internal unity and the general responsiveness of the political system. I examine my claims using a mixed-methods design. I draw on a new group-level dataset on ethnic parties and ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America between 1946 and 2009. My statistical analysis finds that indigenous groups with wellorganized movements are more likely to achieve inclusion in executive positions of state power.
Introduction
In December 2005, the Bolivian Movement for Socialism (MAS) party achieved a convincing electoral victory that brought Aymara politician Evo Morales to power. In a highly symbolic inauguration ceremony, Morales, the country's first indigenous president in 180 years of independence, was crowned "supreme leader" of his Aymara group. The electoral triumph of Morales and the MAS illustrates the arrival of indigenous movements as central actors in Latin American politics following centuries of racial oppression (Dávalos 2005; Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2000 Yashar 2005 ).
Have such movements promoted the inclusion of Latin American indigenous people in executive positions of state power? While the academic literature supplies abundant theoretical and empirical accounts of the (re-)emergence of these ethnic movements (Birnir 2004; Lucero 2008; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005 ), we lack systematic knowledge about their political consequences.
Moreover, almost all comparative works on this subject focus on de jure ethnic group rights (see, e.g., Barié 2003; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000) . In contrast, the question of indigenous people's political inclusion receives much less attention. Yet, according to a number of recent studies, the inclusion of representatives of underprivileged groups in state institutions -commonly referred to as "descriptive representation" (Pitkin 1967, 60-91 ) -profoundly affects these groups' substantive representation in terms of collective rights, redistribution, and public goods provision (Carnes and Lupu 2015; Pande 2003; Preuhs 2006; Reingold and Smith 2012) . Thus, in light of Latin America's history of ethnic discrimination, the question of indigenous political inclusion takes on paramount importance. I argue that the social pressure produced by a well-organized indigenous movement demonstrates the political significance of its constituency. This, in turn, makes the inclusion of indigenous leaders in formal leadership positions more likely. However, a movement's effectiveness generally depends on movement-internal processes of "horizontal voice" (O'Donnell 1986, 251 ) that foster unity, as well as on the general responsiveness of the political system. Focusing on indigenous people's inclusion in executive state power at both the national and regional levels, I test these arguments using a new cross-sectional time-series dataset on ethnic organizations in all Latin American countries from the end of World War II to 2009. I find that the organizational strength of indigenous movements tends to positively affect indigenous groups' chances of inclu-sion in executive positions of state power. Yet, the results also suggest that this effect is conditioned by the level of democratic freedom. Moreover, factional divisions between competing national organizations decrease the political effectiveness of indigenous mobilization. The subsequent case study demonstrates that both the successes and failures of Ecuador's indigenous movement reflect the importance of the theorized processes of horizontal voice. In particular, factional rivalries -exploited by the country's non-indigenous rulers -prevented more farreaching gains in indigenous inclusion at the national level of state power, despite the organizational strength of the movement.
While most of the existing literature on ethnic inclusion focuses on legal and electoral variables (e.g., Htun 2004; Lijphart 2004; Norris 2008) , this study highlights the relevance of ethnic social movements in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination. Thus, it adds to actor-centered accounts of democratization in Latin America (see, e.g., Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Smith 2009 ) by demonstrating how the mobilization of previously excluded actors may enhance political equality in highly unequal societies. In this sense, the findings of this study qualify scholarly arguments which warn against the divisive force of ethnic organizations in multiethnic societies (see, e.g., Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006) .
Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America and the Importance of Political Inclusion
Ever since the colonial conquest, indigenous groups have been politically, economically, and socially marginalized in Latin American societies. Starting in the 1970s, however, they embarked on a sustained process of collective mobilization -first through civic movements (Rice 2012; Yashar 2005) and subsequently in electoral politics (Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005) . Indigenous organizations in all countries have demanded equal political participation, as well as collective rights, such as land rights or the right to bilingual education (Dávalos 2005; Lucero 2008; Yashar 2005) . In assessing the political gains from this mobilization, comparative studies mainly focus on de jure ethnic group rights (see, e.g., Barié 2003; Hooker 2005; Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2000) , examining the emergence of what Van Cott (2000, 17) calls a "regional model of 'multicultural constitutionalism.'" In contrast, although some studies examined indigenous people's participation in local or regional politics of specific countries (e.g., Ospina, Santillana, and Arboleda 2008; Van Cott 2001 , we currently lack systematic evidence about the effect of this mobilization on indigenous people's political inclusion.
The question of ethnic inclusion is closely related to the concept of "descriptive representation" (Pitkin 1967, 60-5, 209) , i.e. the degree to which the composition of political institutions corresponds to that of the people as a whole with respect to demographic characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, and class. A number of recent studies suggest that the descriptive representation of underprivileged social groups promotes their political interests in the policy output of the political system ("substantive representation") -not only in terms of formal group rights, but also with regard to redistribution and public goods provision (Carnes and Lupu 2015; Pande 2003; Preuhs 2006; Reingold and Smith 2012) . Furthermore, the representation of ethnic groups in state institutions indicates their status and power in society more generally (Horowitz 1985, 185-228; Mansbridge 1999, 648-50) . Additionally, as Mansbridge (1999, 650-2) argues, the political inclusion of historically marginalized groups may increase the legitimacy of the political system. Thus, in view of Latin America's history of ethnic discrimination, the question of whether indigenous movements have been able to promote the political inclusion of indigenous groups in state institutions takes on paramount importance.
Studies of the determinants of ethnic inclusion generally focus on legal measures, such as ethnic quotas for minorities (e.g., Htun 2004) or electoral politics, e.g., the electoral system and the impact of ethnic parties (e.g., Lijphart 2004; Norris 2008; Spirova and Stefanova 2012) . However, the effect -and indeed the very enactment -of electoral and other legal provisions targeting specific ethnic groups very much depends on whether these groups have established themselves as recognized political actors in the first place. Also, while ethnic parties may enable ethnic group representatives to take up legislative and/or executive positions, high intergroup socioeconomic inequalities often bias the electoral process against the poorer groups. Under these conditions, ethnic parties resemble "carrier[s] of a challenge to the political system" (Gamson 1975, 14) , thus exercising functions similar to those of social movement organizations. Accordingly, I argue that in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination, as typically found in Latin America, social movements are a key driver of ethnic inclusion.
Ethnic Mobilization and the Political Inclusion of Marginalized Groups
The political inclusion of any social group in the polity hinges on its ability to present itself to the ruling elite as a relevant electoral bloc or as capable of disrupting the normal functioning of the political system (Gamson 1975) . I argue that the social pressure produced by a strong indigenous movement demonstrates the political significance of the indigenous constituency to the government and leading political parties, and thus makes the inclusion of indigenous representatives in formal leadership positions more likely. For instance, national and regional governments may feel persuaded to appoint indigenous representatives to stave off social protest. Similarly, traditional political parties may include indigenous leaders, either at the national level or in specific regions, in order to appeal to this mobilized constituency and thus improve their own electoral success (Madrid 2005, 167 ). Yet, as illustrated in Figure 1 , this effect results from a sequence of two related processes of collective action which, borrowing from O'Donnell (1986, 251-2), we could call "horizontal voice" and "vertical voice." While the former refers to the movement-internal construction of a collective political identity and agenda, vertical voice is what emerges from the contentious actions directed at the ruling elite. The effectiveness of this vertical voice is not only a function of the preceding process of horizontal voice, but also hinges on the general responsiveness of the political system. Figure 1 shows that a movement's contentious actions form the core of what is referred to here as indigenous mobilization. Using both disruptive (e.g., protest) and "insider" tactics, such as lobbying and negotiation with the state, the movement transmits the group's demands to the ruling elite. Strong organizations make these actions possible by providing the necessary resources (labor, money, leadership, etc.) (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1216-20; Minkoff 1997, 780-82) . By establishing an institutional link between group members, indigenous organizations are able to stage large-scale popular protests. Moreover, by aggregating the interests of the individual group members, they can effectively lobby the relevant state institutions and other political parties (Skocpol, Abend-Wein, Howard, and Goodrich 1993, 689-91; Tilly 2004, 139) . However, as Figure 1 suggests, successful contentious actions depend not only on the existence of strong organizations, but also on their degree of unity. The latter results from the movementinternal processes of horizontal voice, i.e., the strategic coordination processes through which a common political agenda is negotiated within the movement, namely the "ideal and/or material interests, the pursuit of which supposedly will guide [its] collective action" (O'Donnell 1986, 251) . For instance, the integration of a movement's different components into a unifying organizational structure that orchestrates the movement's actions can be considered an outcome of effective horizontal voice. Hence, horizontal voice is a prerequisite for a strong vertical voice (O'Donnell 1986, 251-2) .
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In contrast, if horizontal voice is weak or fails to develop, multiple factions that pretend or claim to lead the movement are likely to emerge. A faction is defined here as an identifiable segment of the movement that unites various organizations within it and pursues a particular political agenda. In the case of factionalism, supporters are likely to be divided in their loyalty or become alienated (Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992, 383-4) . Moreover, the different factions will find it difficult to achieve consensus on key substantive issues (Vogt 2015, 37-9) . Finally, factionalism also increases inter-organizational competition over the available resources (money, labor from supporters, etc.) (Minkoff 1997, 782) . As a result, organizations and their leaders become embroiled in struggles over leadership and legitimate group representation, diverting the movement from its Yet a movement's vertical voice only prevails if the political system is generally responsive to the demands of new challengers. Two elements of the political opportunity structure are particularly crucial. First, the degree of democratic freedom -or, reversely, the ability and willingness of the elite to use repression -should strongly influence the political outcomes of contentious actions (see, e.g., Tilly 2004, 125-39; Yashar 2005, 46-9) . A political system that rests upon democratic principles of accountability and free and fair elections can be expected to be more receptive to indigenous (and other social) organizations' demands than authoritarian regimes.
The suppression of Guatemala's Maya movement during the military regimes and its strong protagonism after the country's political opening clearly reflect these patterns. Moreover, democracies are assumed to be more sensitive to the political inclusion of minorities (Gurr 2000, 81-6) .
Thus, the effectiveness of indigenous movements strongly depends on the existence of democratic rights in the country.
Second, the strength of a social movement's vertical voice increases when it forms alliances with the established elite (Tarrow 1998, 157-66) . Because of its concern with social inequality, the Left has been more sensitive to the grievances of indigenous people than other political parties in Latin America and has more actively tried to promote their political inclusion (see, e.g., Becker 2011, 10-1, 50) . In the case of Venezuela, for example, Van Cott (2001, 49) 
Data and Statistical Estimation
The quantitative analysis builds on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-ETH) dataset, version 2.0 (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) . Constructed on the basis of an expert survey, EPR-ETH is a group-based dataset that lists the politically relevant ethnic groups of each country and records their access to state power over time.
1 An ethnic group is considered "politically relevant" if at least one political organization has claimed to represent its interests at the national level or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination (Cederman et al. 2010, 99) . 
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Dependent Variable: Measuring Indigenous Political Inclusion in Latin America
The EPR-ETH dataset assesses ethnic groups' political inclusion based on the positions of the political leaders representing these groups, focusing explicitly on executive power. Depending on the specific political context, this can be the presidency, the cabinet, the army command in military dictatorships, or the ruling party leadership. Version 2.0 of the dataset uses a roughly ordinal scale to measure the degree of political inclusion, composed of three main categories, depending on whether a group i) controls power alone (group status of monopoly or dominant);
ii) shares power with other ethnic groups (either as senior or junior partner); or iii) is excluded from executive state power (group status of regional autonomy, powerless, or discriminated).
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Groups falling into one of the first two main categories can be regarded as politically included in distinction to the excluded groups in the third main category. Among the excluded groups, the category of "regional autonomy" identifies those groups that are politically included at the substate level, as opposed to those that are powerless at both the national and sub-state levels. The sub-state level is defined as a regional administrative level, such as, for example, the departmental, provincial, or district level, but above the local administrative level.
Because indigenous movements in Latin America have attempted to gain both equal access to national political power and regional autonomy, it is important to analyze their impact on indigenous inclusion at both levels of state power. Thus, for the purposes of this study, I constructed an inclusion dummy variable that is coded as 1 if an indigenous group was either included in the central government or enjoyed regional autonomy in a given year. 3 Thus, the dependent variable combines the EPR-ETH power statuses of monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, and regional autonomy into a single category, in distinction to groups coded as powerless or discriminated. Overall, about 17% of all group years are characterized by political inclusion at either the national or sub-state level. Table 1 lists all such instances. 
Indigenous Movement Organizations
To test its theoretical arguments, this study introduces the first cross-sectional time-series dataset on ethnic civil society in Latin America. The dataset covers all of the above-mentioned states from 1946 to 2009 and includes a large number of indigenous organizations in each of these countries along with information about the group(s) each organization represents and its founding year (and year of dissolution if applicable). Ethnic civil society organizations are defined here as non-governmental organizations that are mainly composed of members of specific ethnic groups and whose explicit and main purpose is to promote the political interests of these groups.
Importantly, this is not a complete count of all existing ethnic organizations in the region but a sample compiled on the basis of various sources. In order to avoid systematic biases in the covering of the different countries, I relied on a number of cross-sectional sources.
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Based on the founding and dissolution years of the organizations, I constructed a count variable that indicates the number of civil society organizations representing a given indigenous group in each group year. 5 I then divided this number by the population of the group's country, which results in an ethnic civil society density variable (henceforth called ECS), denoting the number of organizations relative to the population size. 6 This procedure is based on the reasoning that a collective of ten organizations, for example, should constitute a stronger social force in a small country of, say, four million people than in a country of forty million inhabitants. 7 Table 2 5 Note that an organization may also represent two or more groups simultaneously. In this case, the organization was attributed to all groups.
6 Time-variant data on countries' population sizes were taken from the Penn World Table, fect, the quantitative analysis below relies on an "historical average" version of the ECS variable, which records for each group year the mean value of all preceding years.
In addition, the quantitative analyses below include a variable of the existence of ethnic parties that represent the interests of indigenous groups. To identify ethnic parties in Latin America, I
largely followed Van Cott (2005) . According to her definition, ethnic parties are "organization [s] authorized to compete in elections, the majority of whose leaders and members identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic group, and whose electoral platform includes among 
Control Variables
The statistical models control for several group and country-level factors that may affect the political inclusion of indigenous groups. The most important is the relative size of the mobilizing groups (as a share of the country's total population). Larger groups possess a greater number of (potential) followers, which might increase their political leverage. On the other hand, smaller groups may be perceived as less of a threat by the white/mestizo elite, who may thus be more willing to grant them political concessions. The variable of relative group size was taken from the EPR-ETH dataset.
At the country level, economic development is a relevant factor because a strong economy provides the state with more material resources to enact political reforms, such as decentralization, which may increase indigenous groups' chances of political inclusion at the sub-state level.
Thus, I control for states' GDP per capita as recorded in the Penn World Table, 
Statistical Estimation
The quantitative analysis below makes use of Markov transition regressions, which are commonly employed to model processes of regime change (see, e.g., Epstein, Bates, Goldstone,
Kristensen, and O'Halloran 2006). The data on indigenous political inclusion used in this article
contain only very few instances of "backward" transitions: once inclusion is attained, it is seldom measures/combinations (e.g., only secular left and center-left parties) led to essentially equivalent results. lost again. 11 Therefore, the analysis relies on logit regression models that focus exclusively on the attainment of political inclusion, using the inclusion dummy introduced above as a dependent variable and estimating the probability of a transition toward inclusion at time t if a group was not included in executive positions of power at time t-1. 12 In all models, the unit of analysis is the group year, and the standard errors are clustered on the countries to control for unobserved factors at the state level. Following Carter and Signorino (2010) , Model A4 in Appendix IV in the supplementary material also accounts for temporal dependence by including a cubic polynomial of the years a given indigenous group has not been included as an additional regressor.
Although it would allow me to model both the attainment and preservation of political inclusion, I refrain from using dynamic logit models. These models cannot accommodate all control variables because the number of variables resulting from the interaction of all independent variables with the lagged dependent variable is too high to calculate the Wald chi-square statistic with country clusters. Moreover, in the cases of the national umbrella organization and ethnic party dummy variables, the interaction with the lagged dependent variable is not practicable because a positive value of these interaction terms perfectly predicts a positive value of the dependent variable, leading to the loss of the corresponding observations.
13
11 The only such instances of "backward" transitions occurred in Peru in 1993, affecting the Aymara, Quechua, and Amazonian indigenous peoples (see Table 1 ).
12 Hence, these models restrict the sample to those observations in which a given indigenous group was not included in executive state power at time t-1, reducing the number of observations to 1,143.
13 Nevertheless, Appendix III in the supplementary material provides the results of a dynamic logit model with two of the three control variables, omitting the umbrella organizations and ethnic party interaction terms. These results show that the effects of the main explanatory variables are robust to the model selection. The count variable of national umbrella organizations and its quadratic version are jointly significant in both Models 1 and 2 (p=0.000). In order to interpret this result, Figure 2 Notes: Based on Model 2 and calculated with simulation methods using Clarify (King et al. 2000) .
Quantitative Analysis: Ethnic Mobilization and Indigenous Political Inclusion in Latin America
Predicted probabilities of attaining political inclusion as a function of the number of national umbrella organizations within an indigenous movement. ECS indicator held constant at maximum level, all other variables at their mean or mode.
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With respect to the political opportunity structure, neither the level of democracy nor the availability of allies from strong leftist parties seem to have a significant effect on the likelihood of attaining political inclusion. The coefficient of the democracy variable is positive but statistically insignificant. In the case of the leftist party variable, the sign of the coefficient even points in the opposite direction. However, hypotheses H3 and H4 propose a modifying effect of both the level of democracy and strong leftist parties, suggesting that these two variables should condition the influence of ethnic civil society mobilization. Hence, Models 3 and 4 include interaction terms of the democracy and leftist party variables with the ECS variable.
Model 3 focuses on the effect of ethnic civil society mobilization as a function of the level of democracy. The results in Table 3 All other variables behave as they did in Models 1 and 2. None of the three control variables exerts a significant effect on the likelihood of political inclusion of indigenous groups. Although the sign of the coefficient is consistently positive, this observation also applies to the group size variable. While large indigenous groups might be more likely to achieve national-level inclusion, as in Bolivia, Table 1 shows that in almost all instances, indigenous inclusion in executive positions of power has been limited to the sub-state level. This is often the result of regional autonomy regimes, as in Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela. Such autonomy tends to favor small indigenous groups, while large groups face more resistance by state elites as they usually inhabit a much larger territory.
Appendix IV in the supplementary material presents additional regression models demonstrating that these results are robust to alternative model selections and measurement strategies, as well as alternative codings of the dependent variable. First, Model A2 replaces the historical average version of the ECS variable with a simple one-year lag of the variable. Second, Model A3 reexamines the role of movement-internal factionalism, checking whether this curvilinear relationship is specific to the number of national umbrella organizations or whether it also applies to ethnic civil society mobilization in general. To this end, it replaces the ECS density measure by a simple count variable of ethnic civil society organizations representing a given ethnic group, as well as its quadratic version. While the two variables are jointly significant (p=0.000), the signs of the coefficients suggest an exponentially increasing effect of the number of ethnic civil society organizations in general. Thus, the curvilinear effect is specific to the number of movement factions measured by the number of national umbrella organizations. Third, Model A4 accounts for temporal dependence by including a cubic polynomial of the years a given indigenous group has not been included as an additional regressor, instead of the calendar year variable (Carter and Signorino 2010) . This generally makes the effects of the main explanatory variables stronger and/or statistically more significant. Ecuador's indigenous peoples can be divided into two main cultural groups. Highland peoples are generally Kichwa and form part of the larger Quechua ethnolinguistic group. The indigenous population in the eastern Amazonian lowlands is smaller and more fragmented, consisting of 17 Because all interview partners were ensured anonymity, I refer to the "function" of an interviewee (e.g. "state bureaucrat," "political party leader," etc.) and the date of the interview.
about ten different language groups (for example, lowland Kichwa, Shuar, Achuar, etc.) (Becker 2011, 4; Lucero 2008, 10) . Both regions have a history of independent indigenous mobilization.
In the highlands, this mobilization started within a classist (or unionist) framework directed against the injustices of the feudal agricultural system (Gerlach 2003, 61; Lucero 2008, 96-9) .
The lowland groups can be considered pioneers of ethnic mobilization in Latin America, successfully linking ecological grievances to a discourse of ethnic group survival (Becker 2011, 6-7) .
Due to property and literacy requirements, indigenous people were excluded from voting after the country's independence (Becker 2011, 46-8; Gerlach 2003, 26, 30) . Organizations (FENOCIN). Although assuming a less prominent role than CONAIE, they inte-grated various organizations and communities and came to represent distinct factions of the indigenous movement. FEINE, for instance, was founded by evangelical churches as a counterweight to the leftist ideologies within the indigenous movement (Becker 2011, 17) . The organization has often come into political competition with CONAIE, most fiercely when it continued to support Lucio Gutiérrez' government after its collapsed alliance with Pachakutik and CONAIE in 2003 (Becker 2011, 91-4; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 95-9) . FEINE also launched its own electoral vehicle, Amauta Jatari, though it never garnered much support and soon disappeared from the electoral list (Becker 2011, 78, 97; Lucero 2008, 170; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 69 Ecuador's non-indigenous rulers, such as former presidents Abdalá Bucaram and Lucio Gutiér-rez, have often successfully exploited these intra-movement divisions through strategies of clientelism and co-option (Becker 2011, 85-96; Lucero 2008, 179-82; Mijeski and Beck 2011, 92-6) .
The strongest backlash to indigenous mobilization in Ecuador occurred under the current government of Rafael Correa, who comes from a traditional leftist background. He has exploited existing factionalism within the indigenous movement by taking over specific organizations through the infiltration of government-allied elites. 20 A prime example is the contentious change of leadership in FENOCIN, one of the three national umbrella organizations, in early 2013, in which renowned leaders like Pedro de la Cruz were replaced by more government-friendly "newcomers." 21 Furthermore, because Correa and others who are now in power know the indigenous movement very well from the inside, they were able to appropriate the discourse and (to a 19 Interview with indigenous leaders, 2013-4-11-I, 2013-4-15, 2013-4-17 . See also Becker (2011, lesser extent) the agenda of the indigenous movement, thus depriving the latter of its main source of political appeal.
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Hence, the case of Ecuador also reveals why a strong Left does not necessarily promote the political inclusion of indigenous people in Latin America. Even if leftist parties have historically been allies of indigenous movements, as in Ecuador (Becker 2011, 10, 50) , they have their own political agenda. Once in power (or with the realistic chance of winning it), they may exploit indigenous mobilization for their own purposes. According to one observer of Ecuadorian politics, the coming into power of its traditional ally complicated matters for the indigenous movement, as the rightist, neoliberal governments of the past were much easier targets for mobilization. 
Conclusions
This study examined the effect of indigenous movements on the inclusion of indigenous groups in executive positions of state power in Latin America. I argued that, in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination, the social pressure produced by well-organized ethnic movements promotes the inclusion of representatives of marginalized groups in formal leadership positions.
This effect stems from both movement-internal processes of horizontal voice and the vertical voice that transmits the group's demands to the government and the leading political parties.
While effective horizontal voice is a prerequisite of strong vertical voice (O'Donnell 1986, 252) , the latter's effectiveness also depends on the general responsiveness of the political system.
Indigenous groups with strong social movements are more likely to achieve inclusion in executive state power. However, movement-internal factionalism undermines the political effectiveness of indigenous mobilization. Proxying factionalism with the existence of multiple national umbrella organizations, the statistical analysis revealed a curvilinear relationship between the 22 Interviews with outside experts, -4-18, 2013 indigenous leaders, 2013 indigenous leaders, -4-11-I, 2013 indigenous leaders, -4-11-II, 2013 indigenous leaders, -4-15, 2013 indigenous leaders, -4-17, 2013 indigenous leaders, -4-23-I, 2013 state bureaucrat, 2013-5-7-I; and journalists, 2013 -4-5, 2013 -4-9, 2013 23 Interview 2013-4-25.
number of such organizations and the likelihood of political inclusion. While the chances of attaining inclusion are highest in the case of a single national umbrella organization, the existence of multiple factions prevents the emergence of a strong vertical voice, and thus decreases the movement's political effectiveness. Moreover, in line with the theoretical argument and much of the social movement literature (see, e.g., Tilly 2004, 125-39; Yashar 2005, 46-9) , the effect of Latin America's indigenous movements on political inclusion strongly depends on the existence of basic democratic rights.
On the other hand, the study did not find a systematic link between the electoral strength of potential allies from the Left and the political inclusion of indigenous groups. The political changes witnessed in the last two decades -most prominently Evo Morales's rise to power in Boliviaare thus the product of the autonomous mobilization of the historically marginalized indigenous groups. Although these gains in political inclusion do not mean the end of the region's historical racial hierarchies, they constitute significant steps toward more equal societies. In this sense, the results of this study also inform the literature on democratization in Latin America (see Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Smith 2009 ). Specifically, they reveal how bottom-up social mobilization may enhance political equality.
Beyond the Latin American region, the study's findings add to the research on ethnic inclusion (Htun 2004; Lijphart 2004; Norris 2008) , which has mostly focused on legal and electoral variables. Because the effects -and indeed the very enactment -of electoral and other legal provisions targeting specific ethnic groups very much depend on whether these groups have established themselves as recognized political actors in the first place, ethnic social movements constitute a key driver of ethnic inclusion in societies with a history of ethnic discrimination.
Finally, most of the standard academic literature has emphasized the divisive, conflict-fueling force of ethnic organizations (Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2006 ). This study, however, suggests that in such highly unequal societies as in Latin America, ethnic organizations may actually enhance democracy by empowering historically marginalized groups. The
Civil Rights Movement in the United States helped to bring segregation in the South to an end.
Civic mobilization by the African National Congress and other forces changed the Apartheid state of South Africa. It seems very possible that Latin America's indigenous movements will 30 continue to bring about more ethnic equality in this region. This could mean a new political dawn for historically marginalized indigenous groups.
